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The London arrest of the senator and retired general, Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte, on October 16, 1998, at the request of Spanish judge, Baltasar Garz6n,
(the judge of the Fifth Central Court of Instruction of the National Court), and
the steps taken thus far by the British and Spanish courts since the arrest have
had, and will continue to have, undisputed transcendence. The purpose of this
Article is to present and discuss some of the essential legal issues with respect
to a matter that is filled with symbolism and complexity.
This matter is filled with symbolism because Pinochet represents an
archetype of military, ruthless and omnipotent dictatorship, free of any
humanitarian consideration and protected against any subsequent claim in Chile
by his thousands of victims. In addition, the unyielding perseverance of some
of his victims and their relatives has finally opened a door, a hopeful door, to
the legal protection of their rights, which has at least granted them an immense
moral victory.
The issue is a complex one because it involves a mixture of national legal
systems and international law and because the implications for Criminal
International Law are far reaching.
There are two parallel judicial proceedings; the criminal proceedings in
Spain against General Pinochet, and the proceedings in the United Kingdom
that gave rise to Spain's request for the extradition of General Pinochet. Here
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we shall focus only on the former. We shall begin by giving a brief account of
the background and most significant facts in the evolution of the case.'
I. HISTORY
In 1996, the Association, Progressive Union of Public Prosecutors,
presented two indictments at the National High Court of Justice in Madrid, for
the crimes of genocide and terrorism. The first indictment was presented on
March 28, 1996 against the members of the military government that ruled
Argentina between 1976 and 1983. The second indictment was presented on
July 5, 1996 against those responsible for the acts that have occurred since the
coup d'etat began on September 11, 1973. The coup d'etat was headed by
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Chile. Pinochet and his regime caused
thousands of victims, including dozens of Spanish citizens, to become subject
to the crimes of genocide and terrorism. The issue related to Argentina was
assigned, by allotment, to Judge Baltasar Garz6n. While the issue related to
Chile, pursuant to previous proceedings, was assigned to Judge Manuel Garcia
Castellon. The two allegations mentioned above were followed by different
criminal lawsuits filed in the first case, by the Free Association of Lawyers, the
Argentina Pro-Human Rights-Madrid Association and the Left-Wing United;
and in the second case, by the Association of Families of Detainees and Missing
Chileans.'
On June 10, 1996, and February 6, 1997, Judges Garz6n and Garcia
Castellon agreed to process their respective lawsuits. Subsequently, Judge
Baltasar Garz6n expanded Argentina's criminal dossier with the investigation
of the so-called "Operation Condor." It was a program of international
repression in which presumably, the military governments of Chile and
Argentina (among others) had cooperated.
With knowledge of General Pinochet's presence in London, on October
16, 1998, Judge Garz6n issued a temporary detention order against Pinochet,
with a corresponding order for international arrest. These orders were in
support of the agreement on the matter of extradition that was in force between
Spain and the United Kingdom.
That same day, General Pinochet was arrested in London. On October 18,
1998, Judge Garz6n issued a new warrant, which was more encompassing than
the preious one. The purpose behind this action was to correct some
1. For a more complete statement, see generally (1) Antonio Remiro Brotons, El Caso Pinochet.
Los limites a la iampunidad, Politica Exterior-Biblioteca Nueva, (1999) Madrid. The text of the main legal
decisions can be found at (visited April 2,2000) <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio>; (visited April
2, 2000) <httpJ/wwwparliamentthestationery-°fficecouk/pa/ld/ldhomehtm>
2. Spanish law permits the particular or private associations to present criminal process before the
courts of instruction, for which they do not need to be victims of the crime reported.
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deficiencies that were detected and to better adapt it to the laws of the United
Kingdom.
In light of these events, on October 20, 1998, Judge Garcfa Castell6n
issued an order disqualifying himself from proceeding further and passed the
case to Court Number 5. On October 21, 1998, Judge Garz6n agreed to take
charge of the preliminary proceedings dealing with the Chilean case and agreed
to process both cases together. The prosecutor sought to amend the detention
orders, the disqualification and the joinder of the two cases but these
amendments were refused by the judges. The prosecutor appealed.3
On November 3, 1998, Judge Garz6n issued a new court order that formalized
the extradition request against General Pinochet for the crimes of genocide,
terrorism, and torture. Again, the prosecutor appealed by reform and was again
denied by the court.
On November 4 and 5, 1998, in two identical orders in structure and
contents, the Criminal Court of the National Audience denied by unanimity, the
district attorney's appeals over Spanish jurisdiction, on the Argentina and Chile
cases. On November 23, 1998, the Criminal Court of the National Audience
again denied the prosecutor's appeal regarding the unification of both
proceedings.
On December 10, 1998, Judge Garz6n issued a warrant against General
Pinochet that was extended with a new warrant on December 24, 1998. These
warrants transferred to the Crown Prosecutor Service of the United Kingdom
all of the evidence already shown in the case.
On February 1, 1999, in two separate orders of the Joint Session of the
Criminal Court of the National Audience, they decided to deny each of the
complaints filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office against the warrants directed
by Judge Garz6n. It was agreed in the first order, to admit the transfer of the
complaint presented against Augusto Pinochet on March 20, 1998, by the
Association of Families of Detainees and Missing Chileans, and the extension
of the complaint of October 15, 1998, that followed, by the political
organization Left-Wing United. In the second order, it was ordered to deliver
the petition of the judge to the United Kingdom Authorities, so that he may
interrogate Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, against whom a prison order was already
issued.
3. The official position of the Spanish Prosecutor, which was not to oppose proceedings in
progress, since April 1996, was modified at the beginning of December 1997. In March 1996, the elections
had procured a change in the Spanish Goverament, which led to the appointment of a new Attorney General.
The guidelines of the new position of the Spanish Prosecutor's office were exposed by the head prosecutor
of the National Court, Eduardo Fungairino, in a public interview by the newspaper El Mercurio of Santiago
de Chile, on October 22, 1997. Regarding this same issue, see also, CARLOS CASTRESANA
FERNANDEZ, Persecucion de Crimenes Contra ia Humanidad en la Audiencia Nacional. Los informes
que losfiscales no quisieronfirmar, Jueces par la Democracia, n 3-10 (1998).
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On March 25 and 26, 1999, Judge Garz6n directed new extended warrants
of charges against General Pinochet according to the second decision of
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. This decision gave notification of
the same to the Crown Prosecutor Service of the United Kingdom
Subsequently, on April 5, April 27, April 30 and June 16, Judge Garz6n issued
new extended warrants of charges with the new information contained in the
judgment. In addition to the four torture cases mentioned in the initial
extradition petition, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords added
another fifty cases corresponding to the period defined along with 1,198
missing persons cases. These additional cases are also considered a form of
torture.
On September 24, 1999, the Third Section of the Criminal Court of the
National Audience denied the District Attorney's appeal against the prison
orders and the extended arrest warrants against Pinochet. Also, on November
19, 1999, the same court agreed to reject the appeal of the District Attorney's
Office against the decree of Judge Garz6n of an extension of charges from April
27, 1999.
II. TmE FAcTS
The facts attributed to General Pinochet are recorded in a more detailed
manner in each successive order that is issued by Judge Garz6n, which have
been recanted with the collaboration of numerous people, voluntarily willing
to declare and contribute documents.4
In the temporary detention order, which incorporated the first international
arrest order and derived from the preliminary proceeding over Argentina, the
judge affirmed that:
From what has happened, it appears that in Chile from September
1973, just like in the Argentinean Republic from 1976, there was a
whole series of events and criminal activities committed under the
cloak of a ferocious ideological repression against the citizens and
residents of these countries. These activities were carried out by
following plans and instructions originating from structures of power
and their aim was to eliminate, abduct, kidnap and torture thousands
of people, as described in 'Informe Retting' ...
In this respect, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, who was at the time Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Chilean State, undertook criminal activities in
coordination with the Argentinean military authorities between 1976 and 1983
(the period which is covered by the action). Within the aforementioned
4. See National Court, Dec. 10, 1998 (No. 10/97) (for report of these declarations).
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"Condor Plan", he ordered the Secret Services (DINA) to eliminate, torture and
kidnap people and to make others, of various nationalities, disappear from Chile
and other countries.'
Once Judge Garz6n had accepted the preliminary criminal proceedings
concerning Chile, General Pinochet' s indictment, which coincides with the 50th
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, became lengthier,
more detailed, and more impressive to read. It states the following:
From his position of command, Mr. Pinochet Ugarte undertook
activity that was in conflict with his duties as president and as a
member of the government constituted after the military coup on the
night of September 11, 1973. Together with other military and civil
leaders and in agreement with the military authorities that held power
in other countries in the area, such as Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia,
Brazil, and Argentina, he took advantage of his position and used his
influence to create, first in his own country and then abroad, a
criminal organization which was supported by institutional structures
and whose sole purpose was to conspire, plan, and execute a
systematic criminal program of illegal arrests, abductions; deaths by
torture, the displacement of thousands of people and the selective
disappearance of approximately 3,000 or more. Subsequently, the
relationship was to continue with the aim of achieving certain political
and economic objectives that would reaffirm the basis of the
conspiracy and instill terror in the citizens.6
Among the specific facts highlighted by the indictment are summary
executions or arrests leading to the disappearance of numerous people.
Assassinations attempted or actually committed by the DINA outside Chile, in
Argentina, Portugal, Spain and the United States and the widespread, systematic
use of torture in numerous clandestine detention centers.
The acts of torture have been the main focus of the Pinochet case, since the
Judicial Committee of the House of the Lords issued their second decision on
March 24, 1999. The instructing judge considered in his order of April 30,
1999, that hundreds of thousands of people had been tortured:
From September 11, 1973 to practically March 12, 1990, in the cases
studied, the detainees were treated in a despicable fashion while they
were in the detention centers that were run with the authorization and
permission of Augusto Pinochet's government. Various techniques
were used: detainees were subject to violent beatings which caused
fractures and drew blood; they were made to lie face down on the
5. See National Appellate Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction, Oct. 16, 1998 (19/97-L).
6. See National Appellate Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction, Dec. 10, 1998 (No. 19/97).
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floor or stand, naked, in constant light or with their heads covered by
a hood, tied up, 'walled up' or in niches, that is to say in narrow
cubicles in which it was impossible for them to move; they were
suspended in the air, hanging by their arms; they were half-drowned
in water and had electricity applied to their testicles, tongue or vagina.
Other refined methods of torture, such as the so-called 'Pau de arara',
were also used. This consisted of hanging people for long periods,
depriving them of food, water and sleep, subjecting them to sexual
abuse, including rape, exposing them to intense light and loud music,
forcing them to eat excrement or drink urine, striking them
simultaneously in both ears with the palms of the hands, burning them
with acid or cigarettes, yanking out their fingernails, and much more.
The main psychological methods used were the following: they were
insulted and humiliated, they or their relatives were threatened with
torture or death, they were subjected to mock firing squads, they were
told that their relatives would be arrested, they were forced to listen
and observe other people being tortured, they were told that their
friends had betrayed them, they were photographed or filmed in
outrageous situations, they were pressured into becoming
collaborators or signing confessions of guilt.
It has already been said that the torture and the cruel treatments were
repressive methods used throughout Mr. Pinochet's government
against all those detained and those persecuted for ethnic, political, or
social reasons. It should now be added that the main reasons for the
use of torture, apart from revenge and punishment, were to introduce
a generalized fear in the population so that they would be discouraged
from opposing the regime, to destroy physically or psychologically
neutralize the victims and acquire information which would help
repress more effectively the political and social movements of
opposition.
It is important to keep in mind that neither the Spanish Prosecutor's
Office, nor the London Pinochet Defense, has at any point questioned the
truthfulness of the facts that have been exposed in the different judicial orders.
This was confirmed by the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the National
Court when it decided unanimously, to deny the recourse of the Spanish District
Prosecutor, which opposed the Spanish jurisdiction:
The resolution of the recourse does not require a probability trial of
accreditation nor of rationality of the indications of the imputation.
It has not been discussed in the recourse about the scope of the
incrimination, about the consistence of those facts that they describe
as genocide or terrorism for the combated jurisdictional attribution.
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The parts of the appeal have not discussed that those imputed facts
consists of deaths, illegal detentions and torture for reasons of
ideological screening or understanding of the identity and national
values, attributed to rulers and members of the Armed Forces or
security, also with the intervention of organized groups, all acting in
secrecy, acts occurred in Chile during the military regime restored
September 11, 1973.'
III BASIS OF THE SPANISH JURISDICrnON
The basis for Spanish jurisdiction is founded on both International and
Spanish laws. Based on the standpoint of International law, the facts described
fit in the category of crimes against humanity, made known after the Second
World War in the International Tribunal Military Statute together with the
agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the notorious war criminals
of Central Europe, signed in London on August 8, 1945.'
Resolution 95(I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations9
confirmed the principles derived from the London Statute. Subsequently, the
International Law Commission, in its formulation of the content of such
principles, established, in Principle VI(c), what are considered crimes against
humanity. They are:
[M] urder, extermination, slavery, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any other civil population, or the persecutions for
political, racial or religious reasons, when such acts are committed or
such persecutions are carried out with the purpose of perpetrating a
crime against the peace or a crime of war or in connection with it.
Today this category takes into consideration the general or customary
international law'" but in that evolution it lost its connection with crimes against
peace or crimes of war. " Therefore, the crimes against humanity, according to
Article 7 of the Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court, adopted
7. National Court, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98).
8. 82 U.N.T.S. 251.
9. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. DOC. A/1316 (1946): (Confirmation of the
Principles of International Law recognized by the Ntiremberg Tribunal Statute); International Law
Commission, IH Y.B. INT'L L COMM'N 377, U.N. DOC. A/1316/1950.
10. In this sense the considerations contained in the Report of the Secretary-General that contained
the proposal of the Statute for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are relevant, approved
by the Security Counsel pursuant to Res. 827 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. 5/25704 (1993).
11. See Tadic (Prosecutor v. Tadic), Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, No. IT-94- I-AR72, at 72-73 (1995).
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in July 1998, include a collection of criminal acts" when they are committed
"as part of a generalized or systematic attack against the civil population and
with knowledge of such an attack."' 3
Second, in the presence of this type of crime, as cited in Resolution 95(I)
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in Principle II, "the fact that
internal law does not impose any guilt for an act that constitutes crime of
international law, it does not excuse the responsibility in international law, of
those who have committed it." Likewise, and among many other texts, Article
1.2 of the Project Code of crimes against the peace and the security of
humanity, approved by the Commission of International Law in 1996, states
that: "The crimes against peace and the safety of humanity are crimes of
international law, punishable as such, whether or not they are sanctioned by
national law."'4
Third, the assumption within the scope of the international principle of
legality on crimes has been defined, among other texts, in Article 11.2 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has established that: "No one
shall be condemned by acts or omissions that were not considered crimes at the
moment of commission according to national or international law...""5 In the
same sense, Article 7 of the agreement has been amended for the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms dated November 14, 1950,16 and
Article 15 of International Pact of Civil and Political Rights dated December
12. Tbe report of examined acts are as follows: a) murder, b) extermination; c) slavery; d)
deportation or forced transfer of the population; e) incarceration or other serious deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of the fundamental norms of international law; f) torture; g) rape, sexual slavery, forced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and othercomparable serious sexual abuses; h) persecution
of a group or community with its own identity founded in political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
class ... motives, or other motives universally recognized as unacceptable according to international law, in
connection with any act mentioned in the present paragraph or with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
court; i) forced abductions; j) The crime of apartheid; k) other inhumane acts of similar character that cause
great intentional suffering or serious attempts against the physical integrity or psychological or physical
health.' See Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiary of the United Nations on the establishment of the International Criminal Court, Part l, Art.
7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/9 (1998).
13. At this point the definition departs - in a positive sense - from the ones used in the statutes of
the international courts for the ancient Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in which, the following terms were used,
respectively: "when they have been committed against the civil population during an armed conflict, internal
or international" and "when they have been committed as part of a generalized or systematic attack against
the civil population, for nationality reasons or for political, ethnic, racial or religious reasons"; and the
interpretation given adjusts itself for both international courts. Id
14. Report of the Commission of International Law, U.N. GAOR 48thSess., Supp. No. 10, at 16,
U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
15. G.A. Res. 217 (111) U.N. GAOR, (1948).
16. BOLEnN OFICIAL DEL EsTADo (HERmAFTR, B.O.E.), NO. 243, oCr. 10, 1979.
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16, 1966." Nevertheless, these last two texts also state that they will not
prevent the adjudication and sentencing of a person that is guilty of an action
or omission that, at the time of its commission, constituted a crime "according
to the general principles of law recognized by the international community."
Furthermore, the Commission of International Law has before mentioned, in the
Project of Articles, Article 13.2, that: "Nothing stated in this article will
prevent the trial of any individual for acts that, at the moment of execution,
were criminal by virtue of international or national law."' 8
All of this gives rise to the international characterization of the crimes
against humanity, which generates individual criminal responsibility; with each
independent crime having a different denomination in the state judicial system.
The last element to consider is the obligation of the states to prevent and punish
such crimes, expressly recognized in different treaties, in those cases where the
state has a direct connection with the crime or with the criminal, and
interpreted, under customary law, as the state's right to exercise the pursuit of
such crimes.
The fact that the principle on territorial jurisdiction is not the only one that
governs the criminal systems has been acknowledged internationally for many
decades,19 and confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice, in
1927, on the Lotus matter." However, international law, after the Second
World War, has applied the principle of universal2 jurisdiction to those crimes
that are considered especially serious. Consequently, customary international
law today allows any state to affirm its jurisdiction based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.22
17. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) U.N. GAOR, Sess., 1496(a), at 60 (1966); B.O.E., 1977, 103.
18. Supra note 14, at 77.
19. The principles of tenitorial jurisdiction, active personaljurisdiction and protection of the state
(including implicitly passive personal jurisdiction) are already covered in the Resolution adopted by the
Institute de Droit International in its Munich Session. See Tableu general des resolutions (1873-1956),
Institute De Droit International [HEREINAFrER LD.i] 373-78 (1957).
20. In the case of S.S. "Lotus", 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 9).
21. Regarding this principle, see M. Donnedieu De Vabres, Le Syst'me de la Rdpression
Universalle, REvEU DE DROrT INTERNACIONAL PltVi ETDE DRorr PENAL INTERNACIONAL, 557-564 (1922-
1923). Regarding the general evolution, see A. PIGRAU, Elementos de Derecho Internacional Penal,
CURSOSDE DEREcHO InERNACIONAL DE VrrORIAGASTEaZ 1997, TecnosiUniversidad del Pais Vasco, 127-
176 (1998). In international judicial practice the Eichman case, Attorney General v. Eichman, 36 I.LR. 18
(Jerusalem District Court, 1961); 36 LL.R. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel 1962); Demjanjuk v. Petrosky, 603
F. Supp. 1468, 776 F.2d 571 (1985) are particularly relevant.
22. In accordance with Lord Millet: "crimes. prohibited by international law attract universal
jurisdiction under customary international law if two criteria's are satisfied. Fst, they must be contrary to
a peremptory norm of international law so as to infringe ajus cogens." Opinions of the Lords ofAppeal for
Judgment in the Cause: Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
(Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench
Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others
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This tendency seems to be reinforced, in Article 8 of the Code Project on
crimes against peace and the security of humanity, approved by the
Commission of International Law of the United Nations in 1996.23 More
recently, the Preamble of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, affirms "it is the duty of each state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
against those responsible for international crimes."24
From the Spanish law point of view, the opening of the hearings on the
repression of the military after the coup d'etat in Chile and Argentina is made
possible by Article 23.4 of the Organic Law 6/1985, of July 1, of the Judicial
Power,' which provides competition for the Spanish jurisdiction to
acknowledge the crimes "committed by Spanish or foreigners outside of the
national territory, susceptible to characterization, according to Spanish criminal
law, as some of the following crimes: a) genocide; b) terrorism; as well as any
other crime which, according to treaties or international agreements, should be
pursued in Spain." Such rule incorporates the principle of universal
persecution, since the jurisdiction is not dependent on either the nationality of
the authors or the victims, or where the crime was committed.26 Nevertheless,
the cited rule does not mention the crimes against humanity that were not
foreseeable, as such, in the Spanish criminal code."
In general, the Prosecutor alleged that the cited Organic Law of 1985 is not
applicable to the facts that occurred previously, by virtue of the principal of
legality. The Plenary of the Criminal Section of the National Court, in
(Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench
Division), March 24, 1999.
23. U.N. Doc. A/51/10, (1996); see specifically the commentary of this article. As stated by A.
Remiro Brotons, what was already permitted - the exercise of the universal jurisdiction - that it may be
imposed as an obligation on all states. El Caso Pinochet: Los Limites a La impunidad, supra note 1, at 54-55.
24. Supra note 12.
25. B.O.E., 1985, 157; BOE, 1985, 264.
26. See TS, 1993 (R.J. No. 2567, p. 3341-42), the judgments by the Supreme Court on March 29,
1993. TC, Feb. 10, 1997; B.O.E., 1997,63.
27. If the Spanish Criminal Code would have previewed the amount of crime against humanity, the
argument of the Spanishjudicial instances would have been extraordinarily facilitated; in this sense: JAUME
FERRER LLORET, Impunity in cases ofserious human rights violations: Argentina and Chile, 11 SPANISH
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 25 (1993-1994); MONTSERRAT ABAD CASTELOS, La actuacdn de la Audencia
Nacional Espaoiola Respectode los Crimines Contra la Humanidad Cometidos en Argentina yen Chile: Un
Paso Adelante Desandando /a lmpunidad, 2 Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da Univerisdade da Corufia,
45(1998).
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opposition to this point of reasoning together with the instructing judge,2" has
considered that:
It is not retroactively applied when the proclaimed jurisdiction is
exercised within the statute of limitations, as it happens in this case,
irrespective of the date of the facts in question. The cited Article 23,
Section 4, of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power is not norms of
punishment. The legal principle (Article 25 of the Spanish
Constitution) imposes that the acts be crimes, in agreement with
Spanish laws, according to Article 23, Section 4, where it is
mentioned that, upon its occurrence, the guilt that can be imposed
shall be already determined by the law prior to the perpetration of the
crime, but not that the norm on jurisdiction and on procedure is
preexistent to the triable act. The jurisdiction is a pretext of the
process, not of the crime."
Likewise, as stated earlier, the Public Prosecutor's Office opposed the
Spanish jurisdiction repeatedly arguing the exceptions to "judgments" and to
"pending litigation." It was affirmed that contemplated facts in the case had
already been tried in Chile and that there also existed pending criminal
procedures in the Court of Appeals of Santiago de Chile, as a consequence of
lawsuits for multiple crimes of homicide and abductions against the ex
president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.3
Thus, in the cases of the disappearance of Antonio Llido Mengual
(Spanish priest arrested by security agents in Santiago in October of 1974,
confined in a detention center, and subsequently disappeared); Michelle Pefia
(detained in Santiago by DINA agents in June of 1975, taken to a detention
center, not knowing her fate, or that of the son she was expecting);"' or the
death of Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Spanish U.N. "Cemiscon Egn6mica Para
America Latina" CEPAL official, detained in Santiago on July 15, 1976, by
28. The Judge examined the legislation prior to the Organic Law of 1985 and reached the same
conclusion. From a procedural point of view, the legislation before the Organic Law of 1985 also stated
Spanish jurisdiction in matters of genocide and terrorism. In the case of genocide, Organic Law 44(71
(197.1), had incorporated such crime within the crimes against exterior security of the state, which permitted
Spanish jurisdiction for acts that occurred abroad. In the case of terrorism, Law 52/71 (1971), attributed the
knowledge of the crimes of organized military groups, which implicated a special procedural law, The Code
of Military Justice (art. 294 bis), and a Spanish jurisdiction very extensive (art. 17), much more than the one
derived from the Organic Law of the Judicial Power, of September 15, 1870.
29. Supra note 7.
30. he Organic Law of the Judicial Power, Sec. 23(2)(c), states that "the criminal has not been
absolved, pardoned or convicted abroad or, in this last case, he has not served his sentence."
31. On this subject, like in the case of Letelier, the Convention relates to the prevention and
punishment of crimes committed against internationally protected persons, adopted in New York, December
14, 1973; B.O.E., 1986, 33.
20001
LISA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:653
DINA agents and found dead the following day); and the death of the Spanish
Priest Juan Alsina Hurtos (detained on September 19, 1973, by a military patrol
and executed at the Bulnes bridge over the Mapocho river the same day), the
Chilean tribunals decided the final dismissal of the cases, by applying Legal
Decree 2.191 of 1978, of the Military Government of Chile, which granted
amnesty to those responsible for unlawful acts (with certain exceptions)
committed between September 11, 1973, and March 10, 1978, it provided that
they are not the subject of criminal proceedings or convictions.
According to the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the National Court,
such crimes cannot be considered adjudicated, since the Legal Decree of writ
of amnesty, apart from the fact that it is contrary to international law,32 is not
comparable to statutory definition of pardons inherent in Spanish law. Rather
it constitutes a "standard acquittal for reason of political convenience," in a way
that does not affect Spain's extraterritorial jurisdiction by applying universal
principles of prosecution.3
Nevertheless, since the Organic Law of Judicial Power makes the
jurisdiction dependent upon qualifying the imputed behavior in accordance with
one of the categories of crimes mentioned in the proposition. Now, we must•
consider the qualifications established by the Spanish tribunals in the
instruction phase.
A. The Crime of Genocide
In indictment proceedings, it is affirmed that the acts reported could
constitute a crime of genocide under Art. 607 1, under sections one through
five, of the Penal Code of 1995.' The precept establishes that:
Those that, with the purpose of destroying totally or in part a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group, perpetrating one of the following
acts, shall be punished: (1) with a prison sentence of fifteen to twenty
years, if they have killed one of their members; (2) imprisonment of
32. See Victoria Abellan Honrubia, Impunidad de Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos
fundamentales en Anfrica Latina: Aspectos Jurldicos Internacionales, LA ESCUEI DESALAMANCA Y. DEL
DERE3iO INTRN^ACIONAL EN AMERICA. DEL PASADO AL FUURO 191 (A. Mangas Martin ed.)
SALAMANCA. The law of Argentine "writ of amnesty" has been considered contrary to the intemacional
obligations advocated by the United Nations Committee on Human Rights and Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. See U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 46 (1995); Report 28/92 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/Ser.
LIV/U, Doc. 14 (1993). With respect to Chilean Law, the resolution of the same Commission on Human
rights in the case of Juan Alcina, Juan Meneses, Ricardo Lagos, and Pedro Vargara, concluded that the decre
of Amnistfa is incompatible with the dispositions of the American Convention on Human Rights. Report
34/96, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 95, OEA/ser, Doc. 7 (1997).
33. Supra note 7. See LO.P.J. art. 23(2Xac) (in relation to LO.P.J. art. 23(5)).
34. L.O. No. 10 (1995); B.O.E., 1995, n 281.
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fifteen to twenty years if they sexually assaulted one of their
members, or produced some of the injuries under Article 149; (3)
imprisonment of eight to fifteen years, if they subjected the group, or
any one of their individual members, to conditions that place their life
in danger or gravely affect their health, or when they produced some
of the injuries found under article 150; (4) with the same penalty, if
they carried out the forced displacement of the group or its members,
adopting whatever measure that tends to impede their way of life or
reproduction, or these individuals transferred by force from one group
to another; (5) imprisonment of four to eight years if their act(s) result
in any other injury different than those mentioned above.3
In support of the petition to remove jurisdiction from Judge Garz6n,
Spain's Prosecutor raised two principal arguments related to genocide. 6 The
first argument involves the text of Article 6 of the Convention for the
Prevention and Sanction of Crimes of Genocide of 1948, which excludes the
penal prosecution of genocide except by the tribunals located where the crime
was committed or by an international penal tribunal still not in existence. The
Plenary of the Criminal Section of the National Court declared, correctly, in a
manner completely contrary, appealing to the purpose and the spirit of the
Convention:
That although the signatory countries have not agreed upon the
universal prosecution of crime for each of their jurisdictions this does
not impede a party State from establishing a type of jurisdiction for
crimes of transcendence in the entire world and that affect the
international community directly, all of humanity, similar to the way
the very Agreement understands it. What it should recognize, by
35. C.P. Art. 607.1 (1-5) (1995). The incorporation of the crime of genocide into Spanish Law is
full of errors or vagueness. The 1948 Convention on genocide came into effect in Spain on December 13,
1968. B.O.E., 1969, n 34. The Law 44171, of November 15, which contains the recasted text of the Penal
Code, introduced the crime of genocide, by means of article 137 and a text which, under the pretense of
reproducing the language in article 2 of the Convention, substituted the adjective "racial" for the term "social"
and forgot to place comas between the words "national" and "ethnic". With posterity, the Organic Law 8/83,
of June 25th, corrected the first error. LO. No. 8 (1983). The forgotten coma would not be incorporated until
the actual version of the Penal Code, approved by the Organic Law 10/1995, of November 23, in effect since
May 1996. L.O. No. 10 (1995). The actual editing of Article 607, with respect to genocide, corresponds, at
this point, with the terms of the 1948 Convention: "Which, with the intent to destroy, completely or partially,
national group, ethnic, racial or religious, perpetrate that some of the following acts, will be punished..."
36. The order which was appealed before the Appellate Court was that of September 15, 1998, in
which Judge Garzon decided to keep his jurisdiction for the remainder of the proceedings and release an
International Rogatory Commission to the legal authorities of Santiago, Chile, with the hope that it would
confirm, in the briefest way possible, if there are any criminal causes of action against Mr. Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte, and if there are, the number of the crimes that are imputed.
37. B.O.E., 1969, n 34; 78 U.N.T.S. 296.
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reason of the prevalence in the international treaties regarding internal
law, is that Article 6 of the Convention imposes the subsidiary of the
actions of the different jurisdictions to those that the Agreement
contemplates, and in the way that the jurisdiction of a State should
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over acts, constitutive of
genocide, that would have been prosecuted by the tribunals of the
country in which they occurred or by an international penal tribunal.38
The second argument of the appellants refers to the their own concept of
genocide. They allege that the relevant acts were not committed with the
purpose of destroying, totally or partially, one of the groups mentioned in the
Convention of 1958, that is to say, that the repression in Chile during the
military regime as of September 11, 1973, did not act against any national,
ethnic, racial or religious group.
A very different argument, which gathers in good part from the
construction set forth by the instructing judge, has been unanimously supported
by the judges of the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the National Court.39
This approach is centered in an open and evolutionary interpretation of the
concept of genocide, detached from the rigidity of the text of the Convention
of 1948, indebted to the historic moment and the international situation in
which it was adopted. In referencing the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
Resolution 95(I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the works
of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations in regards to the
case of Camboya, the tribunal assumes a concept socially understood as
genocide:
Genocide is a crime that consists of the total or partial extermination
of a race or human group by killing or neutralizing its members. This
is how it is understood in society and there is no need for a typical
formulation. In general terms, it is a crime against humanity to carry
out actions destined that aim to exterminate a human group, whatever
the distinguishing characteristics of the group may be.
It is clear that there was an intention to exterminate a group of the
Chilean population and other residents of similar characteristics. It
was an act of persecution and harassment aimed at destroying a
certain sector of the population, a group that was extremely
heterogeneous but quite distinct. The group that was persecuted and
harassed was made up of citizens who did not match the type that the
promoters of repression had decided on as right for the new order that
was to be set up in the country. This group was made up not only of
38. Supra note 7.
39. Supra note 6.
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citizens who opposed the military regime of September 11 th and who
rejected the ideas about the national identity and national values
sustained by the new rulers but also of citizens who were indifferent
to the regime and these new ideas and values. The repression did not
seek to change the attitude of the group; rather it sought to destroy the
group by arresting, torturing, abducting, killing and threatening the
members of the group that was clearly defined and "identifiable" to
the repressors. It was not a random, indiscriminate act.'
Independent of the intentions of the writers of the text, the Court and the
Convention "came to like" as those members of the United Nations "who
shared the idea that genocide was a hateful scourge which they could be
committed to preventing and sanctioning" successively signed the treaty. For
all of these reasons, neither Article 137 bis of the abrogated Spanish Penal
Code nor Article 607 of the present Penal Code can:
[E]xclude from their classification acts like those alleged in this
cause. Those countries party to the Convention of 1984 still feel that
there is a need to respond criminally to genocide and to prevent it
from going unpunished because they consider it to be a horrendous
crime in international law. This feeling requires that the terms
'national group' should not mean 'a group made up of people who
belong to a same nation,' but simply a national or different human
group which has particular characteristics and which is part of a
greater community. It is in these terms that the acts alleged in the
indictment constitute genocide. So Article 23, Section 4 of the
Organic Law of Judicial Power can be applied to the case. At the
time of the events and in the country where they took place, an
attempt was made to destroy those people from a particular group of
the nation who did not fit into the project of national reorganization
or who were considered by those who carried out the persecution not
to fit in. Among the victims were foreigners, including some Spanish
nationals. All of the victims, whether real or potential, Chilean or
foreigner, were part of a separate community which was to be
exterminated.
However, recognizing that the interpretation carried out by the Spanish
tribunals of the concept of genocide does not find support in the text of the
Convention," it is no less certain that any action of genocide necessarily
40. Supra note 38.
41. See M.A. Castelo, supra note 27, in 38-45; Javier A. Gonzalez Vega, La Audencia Nacional
Contra La Impunidad: Los 'Derechos'Espaioles y losjuicos a los mililaresArgentinos y Chilenos, en XlX
REViSTA EsPA 4OLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (R.E.D.L) 285, 287 (Enero-Junio 1997), J. Ferre Lloret,
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implies a political preconception, in the sense that a specified human group
does not fit in the ideal society. From this point of view, the strategies of
"national reorganization" in Argentina or of the "restoration of the
Chileanhood," in Chile, clearly reflect preconception of genocide; the
proclamations and acts demonstrate the existence of a willingness to destroy the
group, decisive in the type of genocide, and the methods employed to carry
them out fully fit those foreseen in the crime of genocide. The restrictive
concept of genocide, as far as the typology of the groups that are its victims,
literally reflects the text of the Convention interpreted in light of its preparatory
works, and does not correspond with all the genocide that occurs in reality,
more than fifty years later. 2 In any event, from the point of view of Pinochet' s
extradition, the crime of genocide has lost transcendency, in the manner in
which it has been left apart from the trial of extradition.
B. The Crime of Terrorism
The crime of terrorism, since its incorporation to Article 260 of the
Spanish Penal Code by Law 44/71 of the Text recast in the Penal Code, of
November 15,' has passed by diverse vicissitudes and transformations," all
characterized for containing indefinite concepts of the crime.
In the editing of the actual Spanish Penal Code of 1995, Articles 571
through 580 refers to terrorism. The formula utilized to define it, is the
commission of certain ordinary crimes for: "Those belonging to, acting at the
service of, or collaborating with armed bands, organizations, or groups whose
supra note 27, en 21-2. In fact, the texts of the Statutes of the international courts for old Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and of the International Penal Court strictly maintain the definition of genocide in agreement with
the text of the Convention of 1948. although also it is certain that all of them provide equally the form of
crimes against the humanity; S.C.O.R. Res. 827, U.N. S.C.O.R., 38th Sess., Art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993); S.C.O.R. Res. 955, U.N. S.C.O.R., Sess., Art. 3, U.N. Doc. (1994); U.N.Doc.A/CONF. 183/9, Art.
6 (1998).
42. The most evident assumption repeatedly alleged by the specific accusations and the instructional
judge is the one of Cambodia, which is remitted to the Report of the Special Relator. M.B. Whitaker, and his
study over the problem of the prevention and the repression of the crime of genocide, of July 2, 1985; M.B.
Whitaker, Estudio Sobre la Cuesti6n de la Prevenciln y la Represidn del Crimen del Genocido, (July 2,
1985); UN, ESCOR, Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6; National Assembly (Auto December 10, 1998).
43. Art. 260 Penal Spanish Code (C.p., 1971, 44). Terrorism was described the following way:
A person who acts, with the intent of attempting against the security of the State, the
integrity of its territories, the national unit, its institutional order or the public order,
or who would execute acts directed to the destruction or deterioration of buildings
public or private, channels of mass media or mass transport, flow of electrical energy
either another driving force or other analogous facts, shall be punished....
44. Afterwards the Ley 82/1978, Art. 571,580 C.P., 1978,82, abolished such article, among others.
Thereafter, the Organic Law (9/1984) abolished the new articles relative to terrorism (e.g. Art. 174, 216C.P.).
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ultimate purpose is to destroy the constitutional order or gravely alter the public
peace..."
Also in this case, the judicial qualification was refuted by the Prosecutor
that considered in part, the reference to the constitutional order should be
understood relative to the Spanish constitutional order; and in another part, that
the actions of the State could not be considered terrorism.
The National Court rejected both arguments equally, with a greater forcefulness
if applicable, since the tribunal in this case does did not need to refer to a penal
type fixed in an international text.4
In effect, the Tribunal affirms that: "The subversive tendency must be
found in relation with the legal or social order of the country in which the
terrorist crime is committed, or to the one directly affected as the target of the
attack. ... "' It is the only coherent interpretation that depicts terrorism in
Section 4, of Article 23 of the Organic Law of Judicial Power. This section
activates the principle of universal persecution, and not Section 3 of the same
Article, which translates the principle of protection of the State.47
The Tribunal has no doubt that the alleged acts are of a terrorist nature:
We find that the deaths, bodily injuries, coercions, and illegal
detentions which are the object of these proceedings were performed
by people, independently of any institutional functions that they might
have had, who were part of an armed gang. It should be taken into
account that they took advantage of their official capacity to commit
deaths, bodily injuries, coercions and illegal detentions alluded to but
that these acts were committed clandestinely, and not in the exercise
of their official duties. This association for the illegal destruction of
a group of people aimed to be kept a secret and it was parallel to the
institutional organization to which the perpetrators belonged but one
could not be mistaken for the other. Moreover, its structural
characteristics (stable organization), its results (it causes insecurity,
confusion and fear in a group or in the population at large) and its
45. Although, for the purpose of the extradition, they relied on the support of the European
Convention for the repression of terrorism, currently in effect throughout Spain and the United Kingdom,
which permits the universal prosecution and allows the crimes of terrorism to be susceptible to extradition.
See B.O.E., 1980, 242; See generally Convenio Europeo para la Represi6n del Terrorismo, Jan. 27. 1977,
E.T.S. No. 90. However, a universally accepted concept does not exist regarding what constitutes a crime of
terrorism.
46. A.N. supra, (i) note 29 ('Legal finding sixth').
47. See also Contra la Impunidad, Federaci6n de Asociaciones de Juristas Progresistas (FAJP) 33,
33-37 (Oct. 7, 1998) (in collaboration with Professors Mercedes Garcfa Arin, HermAn Hormazabal, Juan
Carlos Ferri Olive, Josd Ram6n Serrano Piedecasas, and Diego L6pez Garrido); But see Gonzalez Vega,
supra note 41, at 287-88.
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teleology (the rejection of judicial order in force in the country at the
time) are all features of armed gangs. 4
C. The Crime of Torture
The crime of torture was not incorporated into the Spanish Penal Code
until 1978. Article 174 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1995, establishes in
paragraph one that:
Torture is committed by a public authority, or official who abuses his
position, with the purpose of obtaining a confession, or information
about any person, or to punish persons for acts committed, or
suspected of committing. They are subjected to conditions or
procedures that by their very nature, duration, or other circumstances,
imposes physical or mental suffering, and the suppression of their
ability to comprehend, discern or adjudge, various acts that attack
moral integrity...
The Spanish tribunals did not consider the crime of torture as the center
of the judicial controversy until the second decision of the Judicial Committee
of the House of Lords.
In fact, in the order by the National Appellate Court of Ordinary
Jurisdiction of November 5, 1998, the Tribunal considered (seventh legal
finding) that the forbidden tortures are part of the most serious aspects of
genocide or terrorism, and since the Tribunal had already accepted jurisdiction
for these acts, it did not consider it necessary to analyze whether the torture was
punishable under Spanish law, or a crime of universal persecution by way of
Article 23, Section 4(g), of the Organic Law of Judicial Power, in relation with
the 1984 Convention against torture. Nevertheless, they affirmed that:
[N]ot only in the case of victims of Spanish origin, as could be the
result from Article 5, section 1(c), of the 1984 Convention, that does
not constitute an inevitable obligation for the signatory States. Spain
would have proper jurisdiction as derived from an international
agreement in the case of Section 2, Article 5, of the 1984 Convention.
However, the question is legally irrelevant to the effects of the appeal
and the indictment.5°
48. A.N., supra (i) note 7.
49. Penal Code, ar. 174 (1) (1995).
50. B.O.E., 1987, n 268, Convenclon Contra la Tortura y Otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos
o Degradantes (i), p. 2405 (in effect on Jun. 26, 1987; in force in Spain on Nov. 20, 1987; in force in Chile
on Oct. 22, 1987; in force in U.K. on Dec. 8, 1988).
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The March 24, 1999 decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords limited the crimes susceptible to extradition to those of torture committed
subsequent to December 8, 1988. The presiding judge focused his investigation
on new cases within the specified time frame - despite the fact that a single
case would have been sufficient to obtain the extradition - and he produced
various orders extending the charges, including 1,198 cases of abduction. This
did not mean to say, however, that those acts committed before the specified
time period were not mentioned. This led the Public Prosecutor's Office to
make fresh appeals that refuted the legal basis of these charges, among other
reasons because they included new acts that were prior to the period established
by the House of Lords. And for the first time, the competence of Spain to know
about the tortures was questioned: it was alleged that Article 5 of the
Convention Against Torture of December 10, 1984, did not give competence
to Spain since the events had not occurred in Spain and neither the presumed
criminal nor the victims were Spanish nationals.
The National Court twice rejected the first argument in the orders issued
on September 24, 1999, and November 19, 1999. 1' For this judicial decision,
in an opinion that we share, Spain's criminal extradition process and the
extradition process of the United Kingdom are independent procedures. The
principle of speciality that governs the extradition process, according to Article
14 of the European Treaty on Extradition, solely "deploys its effects from the
moment in which the person indicted has been extradited, and not prior to, as
claimed by the appellant." 2 In any case, the Tribunal continues, that "the limits
of the eventual prosecution have not been established by the declaration of the
House of Lords, but rather, has to be specified in the final resolution that in
Pinochet's case, should accompany the effective transfer to the Spanish
authorities."
The Court also did not accept the premise proposed by the Prosecutor, to
the extent that the second authorization granted by the British Secretary of
State, to initiate the extradition trial. The authorization also includes crimes
that occurred prior to December 8, 1988:
The Home Secretary considered the accusations contained in the
petition with respect to presumed acts that occurred before December
51. Note that in resolution 47/133 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Dec 18, 1992,
the Declaration on the Protection of All Against Abductions, established in Art. 17 that the acts of abductions
be considered permanent crimes, while its pe.petrators continue to conceal the fate of the missing persons
and until relevant acts are discovered and that Art. 18 excludes for its authors whatever procedural benefits
of law meant to exonerate them fromjudicial process or criminal sanctions. G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. G.A.O.R.
47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1) (1992).
52. National Assembly, September 24, 1999 (No. 80/99); National Assembly, November 19, 1999
(No. 77/99).
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8, 1988, but only to the extent that these acts relate to the criminal
character of what is alleged to have transpired after that date, with
regards to an inquiry of whether the acts of torture, after that date,
were executed in the course of an earlier conspiracy. The effect,
according to Article 7 of the Law, would constitute an accusation of
conspiracy to commit torture that was prolonged longer than that
date. 3
The previous acts are pertinent, as the Court indicates, "so long as these acts are
considered part of the criminal plan, which are essential to England's
substantive definition of conspiracy, which of course does not correspond with
Spain's definition of conspiracy."'
In relation with the second argument, the lack of Spanish jurisdiction by
virtue of the 1984 Convention, the Court limits itself to reaffirming the position
set forth by the National Appellate Court of Ordinary Jurisdiction in the order
dated November 5, 1988. To the extent that it deals with independent judicial
proceedings, and the Spanish jurisdiction for the crimes of genocide and
terrorism has been evaluated, and since torture forms part of these other more
serious crimes, it is not considered necessary to discuss the objection.55
On this issue, the caution of the Court is understandable. The 1984
Convention, establishes specific obligations and rights: an obligation for each
State that is a party to it (as in the case with the United Kingdom, Chile, and
Spain) to always judge or extradite a presumed perpetrator of torture when the
crime has been committed in the territory under the jurisdiction of that State
(Article 5. 1(a)), whenever the presumed perpetrator is a national of that State
(Article 5. 1(b)); or whenever the victim is a national of that State or the state
considers it appropriate (Article 5. l(c)); but also the right of any State party to
the Convention to bring in its penal jurisdiction on the subject, as is specified
by its national laws (Article 5(3)). The meaning of this last disposition is very
simple: what is logical, and desired, is that the punishment for torture be carried
out by those States that have a direct connection with the crime. If, for
whatever reason, these States do not comply with their obligations, any other
53. In effect, the mentioned article 14 sets forth that:
a person who is turned over by a foreign State through extradition proceedings, would
not be persecuted, nor sentenced, nor detained by implementation of a sentence, or
security measure, or subjected to any other restriction of her freedom, for any act done
prior to the delivery different from those which had motivated the extradition.
See Convention Europdenne D'extradition, Council of Europe, European Treaties, 24 Sess. (1957).
54. JACK STRAW, Letter form Jack straw about the Extradiction of Pinochet (visited April 15,
1999) <httpJ/www.derehos.org/nizkor/hilejuicio/straw.htm>.
55. In Spanish law the British "conspiracy" would be equivalent to the "induction" or the
"cooperation necessary." National Assembly (No. 77/99) supra note 52.
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state acting in defense of the victims and in the interest of the international
community for the eradication of torture has a right to so act.56
The issue, then, is to determine whether the penal jurisdiction established
in Spanish law includes torture. But torture is only expressly mentioned in the
much-quoted Article 23.4 of the Organic Law of Judicial Power, in connection
with the crimes of genocide and terrorism. To be able to apply clause (g),
which refers to any crime that, "according to international treaties or
agreements should be pursued in Spain", it must first be demonstrated that this
obligation is established in the 1984 Convention Against Torture. In principle,
the assumptions of Parts (a) and (b) of Article 5.1 are discounted, so if it is
taken into account that Spanish Law does not envisage the principle of passive
personality - even though there are numerous Spanish victims in the
indictment - Article 5.3 could lead to nothing, unless Clause 5.1(c) of the
Convention is considered "self-executing." But this does not appear to be the
interpretation of the National Court, which specifying that: "And not only in
the case of the victims of Spanish nationality, as Article 5, Section 1(c) of the
1984 Convention suggests. The content of this article is not an unavoidable
obligation for the signatory states."
On the other hand, it is said: "Spain would have proper jurisdiction as
derived from an international treaty in the case of Section 2 of Article 5 of the
Convention mentioned." Article 5.2 of the Convention establishes that:
Every party State shall undertake the necessary measures for
establishing their own jurisdiction over these crimes in cases where
the presumed perpetrator is found in any territory under its
jurisdiction and said State does not grant extradition, pursuant to
Article 8, to any of the States foreseen in paragraph 1 of the present
Article.
In turn, Article 8 facilitates the extradition for the crime of torture among all the
party States, indicated in paragraph 4, to that which perhaps the Spanish
tribunal wanted to refer to:
56. "The tortures charged would form part of the major crime group of genocide or terrorism. As
a result it is moot to examine if the crime of torture under our law a crime of universal persecution by way
of Article 23, section 4, letter g, of the Natural Law of Judicial Power, put in realtion with Article 5 of the
December 10, 1984 Convention against Torture, and other treatment or crimes which are inhumane or
degrading. If Spain has jurisdiction for the prosecution of genocide abroad, the investigation and trial must
necessarily reach the crimes of torture integrated in genocide. And not only in the case of victims of Spanish
nationality, conformity could result from Article 5, section 1, letter c, of the cited Convention that does not
constitute a inevitable obligation for the member States. Spain would have proper jurisdiction as derived
from an international treaty in the case of Article 5, section 2, of the Convention mentioned." Id.
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At the end of the extradition among Party States, it will be considered
that the crimes have been committed, not only in the place where they
occurred, but also in the territory of the States obligated to establish
their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 5.
This leads us back to the assumption of Article 5.1 (a) of the Convention. In any
case, despite its lack of clarity, the statement of the Criminal Section of the
National Court that "Spain would have its own jurisdiction derived from an
international treaty in the case of Section 2 of Article 5" is recognized by the
court.
D. The Question of Pinochet's Immunity in the Spanish Jurisdiction
Pinochet's presumed immunity has not been a central aspect in thejudicial
procedure in Spain. There are two claims that have been plead, repeatedly,
before the Spanish courts, by the Public Prosecutor's office: the privileged
position in Chile of General Pinochet, as a senator with a lifetime appointment,
and his rank as the former chief of state.
As for the privileged position of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the presiding
judge already estimated that the requirements demanded by the Spanish
legislation are not satisfied. Article 69 of the Spanish Constitution mandates
that the Senator be of Spanish origin, that he exercise his position in Spain in
accordance with the Spanish norm, "that within other extremes, does not accept
the concept of a senator with a lifetime appointment, that distorts the very
constitutional and legal system of democratic elections with its parliamentary
representatives for the citizens." On the other hand, it responds to the
extravagant reference of the Public Prosecutor's office to Article 606 of the
Criminal Code (crimes against protected persons), in connection with the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of crimes against internationally
protected persons, including the diplomatic agents which was signed in New
York on December 4, 1973, that "it is absolutely unfortunate, because this
Convention is applicable when the interested one is the subject of a crime in the
past, but not when he is the subject of an active crime. The victim is protected
because of their special position, but not the criminal. '"57
57. Order of November 3, 1998, First Legal Finding.
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The National Court, in its rulings of February 1, 1999, announced identical
terms in its two orders5", and the Third Criminal Section of the National Court,
in its September 24, 1999 order.59
With respect to Pinochet's former chief of state position, which
presumably immunizes him from criminal liability, the court issued an order on
November 3, 1998 declaring that immunity does not exist in Spanish law, or
International law, which ties equally to Spain and the United Kingdom.
Among other precedent, the judge invoked the Statute of Military
International Court of Nuremberg, approved in London in 1945, whose Article
7 establishes that the "official position of the accused, whether as Chief of State
or as a responsible official in governmental capacity, should not be considered
as exemption from responsibility or as a reason for a lesser punishment,"
remember that the court was presided over by British judge, Sir Geoffrey
Lawrence, and that case involved the Admiral Karl Doenitz, Chief of State after
the death of Hitler. Likewise, it brings back the British practice of objecting
to do reserves in the multilateral agreements, which exclude the heads of state
fromliability. 6'
Consider the instructor judge who stated:
It is undisputed that the chief of state in his capacity enjoys immunity
for the same reason that the foreign states enjoy sovereign immunity
58. Resolving each appeal interposed by the Public Prosecutor's Office against orders dictated by
Fifth Central Court of Instruction for which they accorded in the first, admit to process the complaint
presented against Augusto Pinochet, March 20, 1998, by the Group of Detained Family and Missing Persons,
and the amended complaint of October 15, 1998, following the Left United; and in the second, free the
International Rogatory Commission to the authorities of the United Kingdom, to interrogate Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte.
59. Fourth Legal Finding.
60. Here the reference to the sentence of the Nuremberg Tribunal is pertinent, cited by Lord Millet:
...the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He
who violates the rules of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the
authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence
under international law.. .The principle of international law, which under certain
circumstances protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which
are condemned as criminal by international law
(The script is from Lord Millet); Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause: Regina v.
Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet
(Respondent) (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division);. Regina v. Evans and
Another and the Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants) Ex Parte Pinochet
(Respondent) (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), March 24, 1999.
61. Second Legal Finding: it mentions the objection to Burundi's reservation about the Convention
of Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973 and the objection
to the Philippines' reservation about Article Four of the Convention About Genocide. In fact, this article was
not included in the corresponding law in the United Kingdom, Genocide Act of 1969.
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for the acts of the government agents acting in their capacity. The
situation is very different, with respect to former chiefs of state.
International law does not demand its protection, and for the same
principles applicable to state action, that does not extend to those
crimes under international law. In this sense, all modem international
criminal law clearly rejects, be it expressly or implicitly, the defenses
based on doctrines relating to official acts and immunity of chiefs of
state or those similarly situated.2
In the same sense, the National Court declared in its orders of February 1,
1999, and the Third Criminal Section of the National Court, in its September
24, 1999 order.63
IV. THE PETITION FOR EXTRADITION TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
On November 11, 1998, the petition for extradition by the Spanish
government was formalized." A detailed analysis of the legal aspects treated
by the different British judicial agencies would go beyond the scope of this
Article, for which we will limit the focus to the basic core of the decisions that
are now in force.65
There are two main questions that have been raised. The first question
relates to the prior extradition, which has been the issue of Pinochet's possible
immunity. This question was resolved by the decision of the judicial committee
of the House of Lords on March 24, 1999. The second question involves the
determination of whether the necessary requirements exist to proceed with the
extradition and has also been resolved by the October 8, 1999 decision, of
Judge Ronald D. Bartle.
A. Pinochet's Possible Immunity
The question of Pinochet's immunity as Chile's former Head of State has
been the center of judicial debate in the United Kingdom.
62. Fourth Legal Finding. The judge added a call to the British courts:
It is given that the British courts have a long tradition of interpreting that the local law
is compatible with the applicable rules of International Law, it is perfectly possible
that they interpret that the Act of Immunity of the State is compatible with the
contemporary International Criminal Law, so much the traditional as the conventional,
and arrive at the conclusion that the Act does not protect ex heads of state accused of
crimes against the humanity and like serious crimes under international law.
63. Third Legal Finding.
64. At the Spanish request they continued other petitions for extradition of Pinochet, from Belgium,
France and Switzerland.
65. See REMIRO BROTONS, Antonio, El caso Pinochet. Los limites a la impunidad, op. Cit.
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During October 16 through 20 of 1998, the United Kingdom witnessed the
development of two international orders issued by Judge Garz6n, with the
authority of magistrates Nicholas Evans and Ronald Bartle, respectively,
demanding the arrest of Pinochet. However, on October 22nd through the 26th
of 1998, Pinochet's defense team requested, among other things, an appeal for
judicial review before the Queen's Bench Divisional Court, requesting the
annulment of the aforementioned orders.
On October 28, 1998, London's High Court, pursuant to a decision by the
magistrates, Lords Bingham of Cornhill, C.J. Collins and J.J. Richards, nullified
the detention orders. One of the orders referred to the assassination of Spanish
citizens residing in Chile, a crime not subject to extradition.' In the second
order the Court points out that General Pinochet enjoyed penal immunity,
derived from his position as Head of State, at the time the alleged crimes
occurred. It was agreed that Pinochet would remain under arrest pending the
appeal.
On November 25, 1998, a Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, made
up of five judges (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Nicholls of
Binkerhead, Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann) decided by a three to two vote, to
admit the appeal against nullification of the order requesting temporary arrest,
denying Pinochet immunity."
On December 9, 1998, Jack Straw of the United Kingdom's Home
Secretary decided in accordance with the jurisdiction granted to him by the
extradition process, to commence the judicial proceedings, with certain
limitations. The proceedings began on December 11, 1998 at the Central Penal
Court on Bow Street, before the Honorable Graham Parkinson, which left the
process suspended when the decision of the judicial committee of the House of
Lords was challenged with the filing of the revised petition that was based on
the bias of one of its members (Lord Hoffman)."
On December 17, 1998, a new judicial committee (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Nolan, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord
Hutton) decided to annul the prior order and to reinstate the litigation.'
The new decision was announced on March 24, 1999. This was a majority
decision, made by six of its seven members (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord
Goff of Chieveley, Lord Nolan, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton, Lord
Saville of Newdigate, Lord Millett, and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). In
66. ANTONIo R. BROTONS, supra note 1.
67. Id. 49-50.
68. Regina v. Bartle v. ex parte Pinochet, supra note 57.
69. For its prior involvement, for free title, with the organization Amnesty International, that has
participated as an intermediary in the procedures. One resource that, apart from other considerations of
funding that could be made, was commuted once the decision was produced, something that would be totally
nonviable, as extemporaneous, in the Spanish judicial system.
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its decision, the committee decided to allow partially the appeal to those acts
of torture and conspiracy committed after December 8, 1988, the date that the
1984 Convention entered in force for U.K."°
The majority of the new judicial committee (four of its current members
had participated in the prior decision to annul the initial order) completely
restructured their argument. This argument has been described as "intelligent
and perverse."'" And that is expressed about the awareness of those crimes
susceptible to the extradition, like a preliminary condition to the examination
of immunity question.72
In the words of the Committee's president, Lord Browne-Wilkinson:
Our job is to decide two questions of law: (1) are there any
extradition crimes, and if so, (2) is Senator Pinochet immune from
trial for committing those crimes. If, as a matter of law, there are no
extradition crimes or he is entitled to immunity in relation to
whichever crimes there are, then there is no legal right to extradite
Senator Pinochet to Spain, or indeed, to stand in the way of his return
to Chile. If, on the other hand, there are extradition crimes in relation
to which Senator Pinochet is not entitled to state immunity, then it
will be open to the Home Secretary to extradite him.
Undoubtedly, the immediate consequence of this approach was to prejudge
the task that should have been that of a judge who was competent to resolve the
case of extradition, when dealing with a recourse that was exclusively to do
with the immunity of Pinochet as a former head of state. Likewise, this
approach reopened a debate that was presumed closed by the first committee,
affirming that the criteria for incrimination should be proving at trial and not
at the time of filing a petition for extradition.73
To it was added a narrow interpretation to the effectivity of the general
international and restrictive of the principle of universal jurisdiction,
connecting its validity in the United Kingdom to the date of the formal
incorporation of the intemational treaties that, in this case, would establish it.74
70. House of Lords (H.L.) Jan. 15, 1999 (Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the
Cause In Re Pinochet).
71. Regina v. Bartle v. ex parte Pinochet, supra note 57.
72. ANToNio R. BROTONS, supra note 67, at 95.
73. The President of the first Committee, Lord Slynn of Hadley, had stated precisely that: "The sole
Question is whether he is entitled to immunity as a former Head of State from arrest and extradition
proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts alleged to have been committed whilst he was Head
of State." See supra note 68.
74. What grants to the states an incompatible discretion with the universal nature of the concepts
of international crime and norm ofjus cogens?
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From the sum of these factors, the majority of the committee eliminated
other charges75 and drew the conclusion that the acts of torture committed.
abroad are not pursuable in the United Kingdom prior to the Convention
Against Torture being incorporated into British Law (by virtue of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1988).76 And this in spite of the fact that, as Lord Browne-
Wilkinson himself recognized, the convention was held "not with the purpose
of creating an international crime that had not previously existed but rather to
articulate an international system in which the international delinquent, the
torturer, would not be able to find a safe refuge." In other words, there is some
considerable confusion between grounds for jurisdiction and crime.
Once substantially shortened, the crimes susceptible to extradition and the
scope of the principal of universal jurisdiction, the majority of the committee
did not have any objections, although with distinct arguments, in asserting such
a principle and confirming the denial of immunity to Pinochet. Only one of the
judges (Lord Goff) manifested himself as a follower of the immunity, as did the
three judges of the High Court and the two judges of the minority in the first
judicial committee.
The majority of arguments offered by the judges extraordinarily varied and
it allowed them to sustain recognizable positions, for what we would conform
to here, with highlighting the principle elements of the discussion on the
immunity of the president of the second committee, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.'
1) In the United Kingdom, the immunity of the state is regulated by the
State Immunity Act of 1978. Its first part is concerned with the judicial
procedures in the United. Kingdom for or against other states. It accepts the
principle of jurisdictional immunity, but with certain restrictions. Section 14
indicates that the references to the state include the sovereign, another head of
state, in the exercise of its public functions, to the government of that state and
to whichever of the executive entity of that government. Notwithstanding,
Section 16(4) establishes that all of part I of the law does not apply to the
criminal procedures, and because of the extradition procedure has a criminal
nature, its allegation is not relevant.
2) Part II of the Act refers to the immunities and privileges of the heads
of state. In Section 20(1), it is established that:
75. See the speech by Lord Hope of Craighead, who was responsible for applying the criteria
adopted to the specific charges.
76. The date of September 29, 1988 was to be delayed until December 8, 1988, which was when
the Convention came into force for the United Kingdom.
77. An opinion which is more in accord with present-day international law and which we share, is
the one expressed by Lord Millet. He disagreed with most of the substantial aspects of this reasoning,
although he began his exposition with the phrase: "Apart from one point, I agree with the reasoning and
conclusions of Lord Browne-Wilkinson." Regina, supra note 68.
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Subject to the provisions of this section and to any necessary
modifications, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 shall apply to (a)
A sovereign or other head of State; (b) members of his family forming
part of his household; and (c) his private servants, as it applies to the
head of a diplomatic mission, to members of his family forming part
of his household and to his private servants.78
The adoption to which such disposition refers is pertinent in relation to
Articles 29 and 32, relative to the personal inviolability and criminal immunity,
like Article 39, that establishes the period from the moment the diplomatic
agent enters a receptor state to the end of his mission, substantiating his
immunity with posterity, for the acts realized in the exercise of his functions.
It is concluded that a former head of state enjoys immunity in relation to the
acts committed during his official capacity.
3) To stop the use of such immunity, accepted as a general principle,
should be abolished. Before the absence of such revocation for the crimes of
assassination and conspiracy to assassinate, Pinochet is immune with respect
to the same.
4) In the case of the Convention against Torture: (a) Article 1 of the
Convention mentions public figures, including heads of the state; (b) The
existence of the Convention and its definition of torture make it impossible to
consider the acts of torture, such as acts done during the exercise of official
capacity as head of state. That is why in these type of crimes, the immunity
does not apply to a former head of state.
B. The Requirements of the Extradition
The consequences of the second committee's judicial decision were
immediate and notorious. From the crimes of attempted assassination,
conspiracy to assassinate, torture, conspiracy to torture, kidnapping, and
conspiracy to kidnap, contained in the first authorization issued by the Minister
of Interior, it will have only been appropriate to consider the crimes of torture
and conspiracy to torture committed after December 8, 1988.
Nevertheless, in its second authorization to proceed, on April 14, 1999, the
Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, Jack Straw, estimated that the United
Kingdom "has the obligation of extraditing Senator Pinochet in accordance with
the European Agreement on Extradition" and highlighted that the crimes of
torture and conspiracy to torture as of December 8, 1988, are "serious." '79
78. The Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 incorporates the Vienna Convention of 1961 on
diplomatic relations to British law.
79. "Neither does the Minister believe that the passage of time makes it unjust or oppressive to issue
an authorization to proceed in this case. It does not appear that Senator Pinochet in those circumstances, such
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Against the arguments of Pinochet's defense team and of the Chilean
government, in that perhaps the trial could have been conducted in Chile, the
Minister insisted on the criteria already announced in the first authorization.
In the absence of a formal petition of extradition:
[T]here does not exist a petition of extradition by the Chilean
Government that the Minister could consider pursuant to British law.
Furthermore, there is no provision in international law that excludes
the jurisdiction of Spain in this situation. The Minister does not
consider that the possibility of a trial in Chile would be a factor that
compensates the obligations of the United Kingdom under the
European Agreement of Extradition to extradite Senator Augusto
Pinochet of Spain.
Once formalized, the Minister's authorization gave course to the
extradition process. On April 30, Judge Graham Parkinson granted Spain a
continuance to gather new information with a deadline of May 24.
On the other hand, on May 27, Magistrate Harry Ognall, of the High Court
of London, dismissed the motion for judicial review of the Interior Minister's
judgment.
The Extradition trial took place before Bow Street Tribunal (London),
concluding with magistrate Ronald D. Bartle's judgment on October 8, 1999,
which considered that all the necessary requisites to proceed with General
Pinochet's extradition to Spain were met.
The applicable law is the European Convention on Extradition, in which
Spain and the United Kingdom are parties,' and the Extradition Act of 1989,
which incorporates the Convention to the British Juridical System.
In no case, as magistrate Bartle points out, it corresponds to check the
imputed facts; it is enough to reach to a conviction that the presumed conduct
constitutes a serious crime in the two implicated countries. The facts and the
defense discussion, repeat in several occasions, is a business for the tribunal
that hears the trial. In its decision, it answers two basic questions:
First, it considers that there is no inconvenience derived from the
Convention or from the British law to consider new information given after
that he cannot endure a trial. Although, the Minister has valued the effect of the Lord's last resolution, at the
reduction of the number and the extent of the potential accusations, for the crimes that have survived and for
the ones that solicit extradition are serious, and its naturalism is such that the passage of time is not a
restriction to be followed."
80. Besides the bilateral agreement of 1981. between the United Kingdom and Spain, which is in
force since July 22, 1985, and which has a complementary character by virtue of article 28 of the Convencion
Europea de Extradicion [European Extradition Convention], B.O.E. n 102, 1986.
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April 14, 1999, the date on which the Interior Minister formulated his
authorization to proceed."
Second, it approaches the question of the double incrimination, that is to
say that the imputed facts constitute a crime in both countries,82 although they
have different denomination, matter that the decision of the Chamber of Lords
Judicial Committee had discussed in a decisive manner, as we have indicated.
With this result, magistrate Bartle hardly had margin to maneuver to move away
from what was established by that tribunal. In connection with the torture, and
in accordance with section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, which
incorporates the Convention of 1984 to the British Law, the magistrate points
out "respectfully, I adopt the Lord's point of view, that Senator's Pinochet
alleged conduct, would be an extraditable crime under the English law if the
actions were substantiated. Even without the direction of the country's highest
tribunal he would have arrived to the same conclusion." In connection with the
Spanish Law, the magistrate broadly refers to In Re Evans, in which Lord
Templemnann asserts:
[I]f the magistrate in charge of the process would not be limited to
consider the behavior of the accused in the extradition claim, then, in
the United Kingdom no one would ever be extradited until the person
would have already been tried and found guilty of a crime against a
foreign state committed in a foreign country.
Furthermore, Bartle asserts:
The Spanish Supreme Tribunal has ruled in two occasions that under
the Spanish law the pursued behavior is considered criminal. In
regards to the decisions about a certain law of their own country,
could I, a magistrate without any special knowledge or frankly, any
knowledge of the Spanish law, contradict the judges in the Spanish
Supreme Tribunal? I do not believe so.
81. The magistrate asserts: "Section 7(2)(b) of the Extradition Law which refers to "details of the
crime that is being charged" which "will be included with the complaint", in my opinion, it does not limit
the Court to those details that were given with the original complaint, or that were in the domain of the
Interior Minister when he granted the authorization to proceed. The additional material, alleged by the
defense, in my opinion, records and broadens senator Pinochet's alleged known conduct in his participation
in the torture acts and the conspiracy to commit such acts. If this material would describe totally different
crimes, the position would be different.
82. Section 2(1) of the Extradition Law of 1989, defines an extraditable crime as the "conduct in
a foreign territory, which if occurred in the United Kingdom, will constitute a punishable crime with jail, with
a minimum time served of 12 months, or whatever greater punishment, and which, described in whatever
manner by the foreign law, would also be punishable the same way."
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Consequently, he concludes "I am bound by the Spanish arguments in regards
to the law of their own nation and therefore, I determine that the double
incrimination law is satisfied."
In the same manner, Magistrate Bartle considers that the information
available shows "a line of conduct equivalent to torture and torture conspiracy,
for which senator Pinochet does not have immunity," that is why he
understands that "the information pertaining to the conspiracy allegations prior
to December 8, 1998 can be considered by the tribunal since the conspiracy is
a continuous crime." Finally, the magistrate does not close the doors to the
analysis of the missing person's cases: "The question of whether the missing
persons issue constitute torture; whether the effects on the families of the
missing persons may constitute mental torture; which was Senator Pinochet's
regime intention, is in my opinion, a question for the trial."
Magistrate Bartle's conclusion is then favorable to the extradition, because
all the conditions established in the Extradition Act of 1989 are met. The
appeal to the High Court is still pendant, the hearing is scheduled for March 20,
2000, and then, if proper, the appeal to the Chamber of Lords. If Magistrate
Bartle's decision is confirmed, as it reasonably can be expected, the Interior
Minister will hold in his hands the final decision to grant Pinochet's extradition
to Spain.3
In any event, if Pinochet is either finally transferred to be tried in Spain,
or if his return to Chile is granted, based on the considerations regarding his age
or his health situation, his moral condition -of more than a presumed
international criminal in the eye's of humanity- will not be substantially altered.
In addition, the enormous space of impunity for international crimes will have
decreased a little more."
83. Furthermore, consider that the Interior Minister does not have an unlimited discretional margin,
because the extradition is an obligation derived from the European Convention, which is in force between
Spain and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the defendant's health situation, whose examination was also
ordered by the Minister himself, can be deemed relevant at the time of his decision making.
84. Once this article is finished, Jack Straw decided to interrupt the extradition process on medical
grounds. On March 2, 2000 Pinochet was released and he returned to Chile on the same day. At present, he
is being accused before the Chilean justice of more than a hundred claims.
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